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It is an extraordinary honor for me to deliver these remarks at this
Symposium on the Jurisprudence of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a true
American hero. No living judge has had a greater impact on American law.
While this is a conference about Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence, and
particularly her jurisprudence since joining the Supreme Court in 1993, that
jurisprudence is inevitably shaped by Justice Ginsburg's experiences before
she joined the Court. She is a pioneer. When she entered Harvard Law
School in 1956, she was one of only nine women in her class, and she faced
the formidable obstacles to equal participation in professional and public life
that women faced at that not-so-distant time in the past.
After she graduated from Columbia Law School at the top of her class,
no law firm in New York offered her a job. When in 1960 the Dean of the
Harvard Law School recommended her for a clerkship with Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Justice replied that he was not ready to hire a
woman.' She joined the faculty at Rutgers and then moved to Columbia
where she was the first woman to become a tenured law professor.2 As the
Director of the Women's Rights Project at the ACLU, she won Reed v.
Reed,3 in which she represented the appellant, and five of the six sex
discrimination cases she argued before the Supreme Court, including the 8-1
decision in Frontiero v. Richardson,4 altering the course of American
constitutional law, and opening the path to the recognition of the equality of
women under that fundamental charter of equality. In 1980, President Jimmy
Carter appointed her to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
* Associate Justice, Massachusetts Appeals Court; Professor of Law, Georgetown
University. This paper is based on the Keynote Address given by the author at the
Symposium entitled "The Jurisprudence of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Discussion of
Fifteen Years on the U.S. Supreme Court," held at The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law on April 10, 2009.
1 Neil Lewis, Rejected as a Clerk, Chosen as a Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993,
at Al.
2 Id.
3 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
4 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Justice Ginsburg's other victories came in Edwards v. Healy,
421 U.S. 772 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
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Columbia Circuit, and in 1993, President William Jefferson Clinton elevated
her to the United States Supreme Court, where she serves with such
distinction today. She is only the second woman to sit on that Court, and is
the only woman among the nine current members of our High Court.
You have heard already today about Justice Ginsburg's impact on a
variety of substantive areas of the law: civil procedure, equal rights, other
areas of constitutional law. But I want to talk about Justice Ginsburg as a
judge, about what her jurisprudence tells us about her approach to judging,
and about what her work teaches us about the proper role of courts and
judges in our constitutional system.
This is a topic that is of particular interest to me as a judge. But, as
Justice Ginsburg doubtless recognizes, it is of broader importance to society
at large. The role of the courts in our system of government, and the way
they ought to function, is a question of ongoing debate and deep significance
that touches all Americans, and, indeed, in light of the unique position of the
United States, one that touches people everywhere in the world.
From the description of her substantive work, you will by now have
realized that courage and candor are the hallmarks of her jurisprudence. It is
a matter of debate whether these are characteristics that can be taught or
learned, but because she possesses them, Justice Ginsburg has earned a
distinctive place in the judicial pantheon.
In my remarks today, however, I want to focus upon three lessons
implicit in Justice Ginsburg's work on the Supreme Court that can indeed be
learned, but that have at best been hinted at by the sessions examining her
jurisprudence in various substantive areas of law. The first has to do with the
appropriate scope of the judicial power. The second with the nature of the
judicial function. And the third has to do with collegiality on a multimember
court.
You have heard today about some of Justice Ginsburg's justly famous
opinions, from United States v. Virginia5 to ML.B.6 to Ledbetter.7 But the
lens through which I want to begin my examination of her approach to
judging is a case that has received little attention. It is Kontrick v. Ryan,8 a
case from 2004 about whether a time limit contained in a Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure is jurisdictional.
Now I know what you're thinking: I had thought this event might be
entertaining, but I never imagined that I would get to hear a talk about
something as exciting as the time limits in the Bankruptcy Rules. But if
5 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
6 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
7 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
8 540 U.S. 443 (2004).
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you'll bear with me, you'll find that the way in which Justice Ginsburg
parsed those Rules is deeply revealing.
The Bankruptcy Code contains a rule that limits the time within which
one may file a complaint objecting to a debtor's discharge. Such a complaint
must be filed within sixty days of the first date set for a meeting of creditors.9
That same rule provides that an extension of time may be granted if a motion
seeking to extend the time is filed before the time for filing has expired.'
And another rule makes clear that an enlargement of time for filing the
complaint is not permitted for any reason except as stated in the rule itself."
There are other rules like the latter one with which you may be more
familiar. This Bankruptcy Rule is modeled on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 6(b), which prohibits extending the time for certain post-trial
motions-for example motions under Rule 5 0(b) for judgment as a matter of
law or Rule 59(b) for a new trial, which must be brought within ten days of
the entry ofjudgment.'2
In Kontrick, the debtor brought a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. 13 A
creditor filed a timely complaint objecting to the discharge, but subsequently,
and outside the sixty-day time limit, filed an amended complaint that added a
new claim. 14 That untimely claim was litigated to judgment. The debtor
never raised its untimeliness before the bankruptcy court. But after judgment,
for the first time, the debtor argued that that court was powerless to
adjudicate the claim because it was filed untimely.'5 The court's action, he
claimed, was in violation of a jurisdictional time limit. And eventually he
brought that argument to the United States Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari on the question of whether the deadline set in the rule was, in the
words of one of the Court's prior cases, "mandatory and jurisdictional" and
thus could not be waived.'
6
Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion in Kontrick for a unanimous court.
And she concluded that the debtor was not entitled to raise the untimeliness
of the creditor's new claim after the debtor had "litigated and lost the case on
the merits."' 7 Although the claim had not been timely when it was filed, the
9 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a).
10 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(b).
11 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(3).
12 See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(2), 50(b), 59(b).
13 Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 448.
14 Id. at 448-49.
15 Id. at 451.
16 Id. at 452 n.7 (quoting language in the Question Presented originally used by the
Court in United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 228-29 (1960)).
17 Id. at 458-60.
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deadline imposed by the rule was not, Justice Ginsburg concluded,
"jurisdictional." Questions of a federal court's jurisdiction, of course, may
not be waived. They may be raised by the parties at any time, and, indeed,
the court has an obligation in every case to determine sua sponte whether it
has jurisdiction.'8
In Kontrick, there was no dispute that the deadline contained in the rule
determined when a creditor's complaint could be filed. Nor was there any
question that it was a rigid deadline. The courts were without power to
extend it.
Justice Ginsburg noted, however, that courts, including the Supreme
Court, had been, in her words, "less than meticulous" in their use of the word
"jurisdictional" to describe mandatory filing deadlines.' 9 Congress confers
subject-matter jurisdiction upon the courts, and in this case jurisdiction was
conferred upon the bankruptcy court by a statute that contained no time
limitation.20 The Bankruptcy Rules, promulgated by the Supreme Court like
the rules of practice and procedure in the district courts and courts of appeals,
while imposing what Justice Ginsburg called an "inflexible" rule,21 neither
created nor extinguished federal jurisdiction. The deadline thus was not
"jurisdictional." As a consequence, even if such an inflexible claim
processing rule was unalterable on a party's application, if the opposing party
failed to raise the violation of the rule in a timely fashion, that objection
could be waived. Put another way, the untimeliness of a creditor's complaint
in a case like the one before the Court, could not be raised for the first time
on appeal.
Kontrick is a rather remarkable decision in many dimensions. It
highlights Justice Ginsburg's precision of thinking, which is a hallmark of
her jurisprudence and an example for other judges. It highlights, too, her
insistence upon the precise use of language. As she wrote in that case,
"[c]larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label
'jurisdictional' not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions
delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons
(personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory authority. 22
But most important, Kontrick shows the nature of Justice Ginsburg's
approach to adjudication. The adjudicatory power, she wrote while serving as
a Circuit Judge on the United States Court of Appeals, is an "awesome
18 See Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382
(1884).
19 1d. at 454.
20 Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 444.
2 1 1d. at 444,456.
2 2 ld. at 455.
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authority., 23 Of course there is an enormous literature about the importance
of limitations on that authority, for the proper functioning of democracy,
24
for each of the co-equal branches of the federal government to robustly play
its appropriate role,25 and for the proper balance of power within our federal
system.26  And the fundamental limits upon judicial authority are
jurisdictional limits: only when there is subject-matter and personal
jurisdiction over the parties, Justice Ginsburg explained in her 1999 decision
in Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil, may a court's decision bind those parties.27
And a court must ensure that it has jurisdiction before it exercises what
Justice Ginsburg has elsewhere characterized as its "substantive 'law-
declaring power.'
28
But Kontrick concludes that the limits placed on the filing of the
complaint in that case were not jurisdictional. Her opinion for the Court in
that case demonstrates that for Justice Ginsburg, questions of jurisdiction are
not mechanisms to be used for policy reasons to avoid adjudication. Kontrick
expresses a commitment to the dual bedrock proposition about federal court
jurisdiction articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in 1821 in Cohens v.
Virginia,29 a proposition Justice Ginsburg expressly invoked in the opening
lines of her opinion in Marshall v. Marshall, the Anna Nicole Smith case,
where she wrote:
In Cohens v. Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall famously cautioned: "It is
most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is
equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should .... We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. 3°
There, Justice Ginsburg had concluded that the "probate exception" to
federal jurisdiction was a narrow one that did not bar Smith's suit against the
23 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185,
1186 (1992).
24 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
25 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999).
26 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
27 See 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999).
28 Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 433 (2007)
(citing Ruhrgas AG, 526 U.S. at 584-85, in turn quoting In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247,
255 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
29 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
30 Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 298-99 (2006) (citing Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404
(1821)).
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son of her late husband, a suit that was otherwise within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts under the terms of the bankruptcy statute.3
Recognizing that there is a difference between an absence of jurisdiction
and a failure to meet some nonjurisdictional deadline, which leaves the Court
with the power to exercise its jurisdiction, is not just the dry, technical stuff
of federal procedure. For the importance of cabining claims of a
jurisdictional bar to those cases in which the bar truly is jurisdictional is quite
profound. To see this, one need look no further than the 2007 case of Bowles
v. Russell,32 where the Court divided closely about the application of the rule
articulated by Justice Ginsburg in Kontrick.3 3
In that case, a district judge extended the time within which a prisoner
could appeal from the denial of his petition for habeas relief. The judge set a
due date for the notice of appeal that was seventeen days after his order.34
The Federal Rules and the statute, however, allowed him to extend the time
only for fourteen days.35 As the Court majority noted, the judge's action was
"inexplicabl[e] .,,36
The Supreme Court divided 5-4 about whether that fourteen-day limit
was jurisdictional. Justice Thomas wrote the opinion of the Court that held
the prisoner's appeal barred.37 Even though the district judge had told the
prisoner that he could file his notice of appeal on the date it was filed, the
Court held, the prisoner had missed the deadline.38
Justice Ginsburg joined the dissent, which was written by Justice Souter.
The dissent concluded that it was "intolerable for the judicial system to treat
people this way," and, it concluded that, because the rule providing for only a
fourteen-day extension was not jurisdictional, such treatment was not
required by law.3 9 The dissenting opinion put the gravamen of the matter
aptly, saying:
The stakes are high in treating time limits as jurisdictional. While a
mandatory but nonjurisdictional limit is enforceable at the insistence of a
party claiming its benefit or by a judge concerned with moving the docket,
it may be waived or mitigated in exercising reasonable equitable discretion.
But if a limit is taken to be jurisdictional, waiver becomes impossible,
3 1 Id. at 299-300.
32 551 U.S. 205 (2007).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 207.
35 See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6).
3 6 Bowles, 551 U.S. at 207.
3 7 Id. at 206-07.
3 8 Id. at 214-15.
39 Id. at 215 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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meritorious excuse irrelevant (unless the statute so provides), and sua
sponte consideration in the courts of appeals mandatory ....
40
So a first lesson about judging in Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence is to
take care not to exceed one's jurisdiction, but-and here there is a hint of the
courage I spoke of at the outset-to exercise that jurisdiction where it is
properly invoked.
A second lesson is to be attentive in exercising judicial authority to the
proper role of the courts. Our courts exist to resolve disputes, and they do so
within the context of an adversarial system. In criminal cases, in particular,
the adversary nature of our system reflects the departure of the English
common law from inquisitorial continental European systems that rely upon
examination by judicial officers. We are justly proud of our adversary system
as-in Wigmore's words about cross-examination, its inherent constituent-
an "engine... for the discovery of truth. '
Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence is animated by recognition that the
judge's role is that of adjudicator in a system that is fundamentally an
adversarial one. Indeed, that is an animating principle in the Kontrick
decision that I have already been using as an example. In that case, the
creditor brought a claim outside the time limit provided for by the Rules. But,
Justice Ginsburg wrote, despite that, the decision against the debtor could not
be reversed for that reason on appeal-because he had failed to raise the
point in the adversarial proceeding below.42
The lesson for judges is that, once satisfied that there is jurisdiction,
courts in our system should in general decide the cases as they are presented
to them. They are to adjudicate. Thus, in a case last June Justice Ginsburg
wrote:
In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first
instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation. That
is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to
courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present .... As
cogently explained [by the late Judge Richard Arnold of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit]: "[Courts] do not, or should not,
sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right. We wait for cases to come
40 Id. at 216-17.
41 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (J.
Chadbourn rev. 1974).
42 Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 458-60.
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to us, and when they do we normally decide only questions presented by the
parties.'
43
And here she quoted Ben Kaplan, the great former Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court who remains to this day, four days
after his ninety-eighth birthday, my colleague as a Recall Justice on the
Massachusetts Appeals Court, who wrote in 1960 that our system-in a
uniquely American way--"exploits the free-wheeling energies of counsel
and places them in adversary confrontation before a detached judge.""
This is not to say that this is an inflexible rule for Justice Ginsburg. She
has noted that courts will depart from this rule to protect the rights of pro se
litigants,'45 and has suggested that the same might be permissible in certain
circumstances in the case of criminal defendants who are represented.46 But
she has been clear in articulating and abiding by the general rule.
And it is a rule that judges valuably heed. For even when a court has
power to decide a case on a ground not raised by a party, the adoption of a
position that has not been tested before us in the crucible of the adversary
process may have unintended consequences, much like the expression of
rules that are broader than necessary for decision. And, while, as many
appellate judges have noted, the briefs before us may not always be of
uniform quality,47 the courts' assumption of the responsibility for crafting
arguments on behalf of the parties can only undermine the important
incentives for counsel zealously and thoroughly to present their clients'
cases. The rule of restraint articulated by Justice Ginsburg, like many of the
rules that cabin our work as judges, does not exist simply for its own sake.
As I have found in my own work, it reflects a profound insight into the
prudent use ofjudicial power.
Finally, I want to talk about Justice Ginsburg and the question of
collegiality on a multimember court. Courts are by nature human institutions.
If that is something one can recognize as a layperson, law student, or lawyer,
if it is something one can see at close hand as a law clerk, it is something the
myriad dimensions of which one can perhaps not really grasp until one has
43 Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2564 (2008) (quoting United States v.
Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir. 1987)).
44 Benjamin Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9
BuFF. L. REv. 409, 431 (1960).
45 Greenlaw, 128 S. Ct. at 2560.
46 See id.
47 E.g., Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the
Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 3, 10 (2008); Interview with Richard A.




had the experience of sitting as a judge on such a multimember court.
Certainly it is something I have come to appreciate more fully since my own
appointment to the bench.
One cannot discuss Justice Ginsburg's role on the Supreme Court
without discussing collegiality. It is a topic on which she wrote while serving
on the D.C. Circuit,48 and recognition of its importance animates not just her
jurisprudence, but her life.
We are not so many years from Justice Holmes' reputed remark that the
Justices of the High Court were "nine scorpions in a bottle.' '49 In the years
since that time, Justice Black after the Court's weekly conference once
reported of his colleague Justice Felix Frankfurter, "I thought Felix was
going to hit me today, he got so mad." 50 Even closer to home, while Justice
Ginsburg sat on the D.C. Circuit, one of her colleagues said to another in the
private conference held after oral argument, "if you were 10 years younger,
I'd be tempted to punch you in the nose."51 In 1990, Judge Posner, who sits
on the Seventh Circuit, wrote:
The tensions within an appellate court in which all the judges sit en banc
(rather than in rotating panels, the normal mode in the federal courts of
appeals) are great; they are greatest in the Supreme Court. It is like arranged
marriage in a system with no divorce. The tensions fester, generating
debilitating personal rivalries, resentments, apathy, burnout, idiosyncrasy,
and a shrill and nasty rhetoric of invective.
52
Yet by all accounts, the era during which Justice Ginsburg has sat on the
Supreme Court has been perhaps the most collegial in its history. Justice
Breyer has said that he has never heard a voice raised in anger in the Justices'
private conference room.53 There can be no doubt of the significant role
Justice Ginsburg has played in this collegiality. The public evidence is
remarkable. Shortly after joining the Court, Justice Ginsburg appeared in
costume with one of the Justices with whom she most often disagrees, her
friend Justice Antonin Scalia, in the Washington Opera Production of
48 See Ginsburg, supra note 23.
49 Richard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L.
REv. 13, 14 (1990) (attributing this phrase to Justice Holmes).
50 HUGO BLACK, JR., My FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 234 (1975).
51 Neil A. Lewis, The 1992 Campaign: Selection of Conservative Judges Insures a
President's Legacy, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1, 1992, at A13.
52 Posner, supra note 49, at 14.
53 John F. Kennedy Library Foundation, A Conversation with Justice Stephen
Breyer (Sept. 21, 2003), http://www.jfldibrary.org/NR/rdonlyres/0B208E56-8F66-4C2C-
Al B4-B7B997CAB5DO/3005 1/BREYER.pdf.
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Ariadne aufNaxos.54 She and Justices Anthony Kennedy and Steven Breyer
appeared-playing judges-in a Washington production of Die Fledermaus
in 2003." Justices Ginsburg and Scalia and their spouses spend New Year's
Eve together every year.56 And she has traveled abroad at various times with
colleagues, including Justices Scalia and O'Connor.
Collegiality is important for a number of reasons, but perhaps the most
important is the role it plays in assuring clarity in the law. For whenever
possible, a court should speak with clarity, in a single voice. Under our
system, we abandoned seriatim opinions near the very beginning, in the time
of Chief Justice Marshall. Yet we have, in Justice Ginsburg's words,
"place[d] no formal limit on the prerogative of each judge to speak out
separately., 57 Given this framework, Justice Ginsburg has explained that
"overindulgence in separate opinion writing may undermine both the.
reputation of the judiciary for judgment and the respect accorded court
dispositions. Rule of law virtues of consistency, predictability, clarity, and
stability may be slighted when a court routinely fails to act as a collegial
body. "58
One of the most interesting things that I have come to realize since
becoming a judge is that, regardless of the similarity of their views, no two
people will write exactly the same opinion. Indeed, as Justice Ginsburg
herself noted in an article in 1992, Chief Justice Stone once wrote to Karl
Llewellyn: "You know, if I should write in every case where I do not agree
with some of the views expressed in the opinions, you and all my other
friends would stop reading my separate opinions. 59
Yet for the sake of the clarity and usefulness of the law, judges on
multimember courts must routinely join opinions that are not written as they
would have written them. It is an obligation inherent in our system. And if
this presents a challenge on a court that sits in panels, like mine or the D.C.
Circuit on which Justice Ginsburg sat, how much more difficult must it be on
a nine-member court like the Supreme Court that hears every case en banc?
54 Stephen Wigler, Staging, Singing Make Washington Opera's 'Ariadne' Almost
Magical, BALT. SUN, Jan. 10, 1994, at 2D.
55 Ann Geracimos & Kevin Chaffee, Opera Season Opens in Supreme Fashion,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at B8.
56 Joan Biskupic, Justices Strike a Balance, USA TODAY, Dec. 26, 2007, at I D.
57 Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 1190.
58 Id. at 1191.
59 See id. (quoting WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 62
(1964), in turn quoting Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of




In this regard, Justice Ginsburg clearly recognizes the importance of
human relations on a court in furthering rule of law values. As their voting
records make clear, no Justice's mind has been changed merely by the
friendships among them. But federal judges are appointed for life. They may
serve with one another for years, even decades. Examining an opinion
circulated by a person you have come to like and trust is likely to be a
different experience entirely from examining an opinion from a colleague
with whom you are not friendly, one with whom you have not built a similar
bond of trust. Likewise the process of reviewing suggestions from another
judge that might permit him or her to join your opinion. Anecdotes from
Supreme Court history confirm this human truth, and there can be little doubt
that, while it may not be quantifiable with precision, Justice Ginsburg's
conduct toward her colleagues, and the atmosphere it has helped engender
more broadly-and the pun is indeed intentional-has played a role in
allowing the Court to speak with one voice, where the views of its Justices
make that possible.
Collegiality, too, is part of a virtuous circle, and Justice Ginsburg has
cautioned against separate writing that generates more heat than light.
Needless invective and personal attack, she noted, disserve the causes of
public respect for the courts and the administration of justice.60 Indeed, such
attacks can make collegial work more difficult in the human institutions that
are our courts. Thus, for example, she concurred only in the judgment in
Washington v. Glucksberg,61 disagreeing with Justice O'Connor, who had
joined the Court's opinion and written her own opinion concurring in it.62
Nonetheless, Justice Ginsburg wrote only a short opinion stating that she
concurred in the judgment-that she thought the case came out correctly
even though she disagreed with the majority opinion-"substantially for the
reasons stated by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion. 63 In
somewhat the same vein, in her separate dissent in the 1995 affirmative
action case, Adarand Constructors v. Pena,64 Justice Ginsburg wrote, in her
words, "to underscore not the differences the several opinions in this case
display, but the considerable field of agreement-the common
understandings and concerns-revealed in opinions that together speak for a
majority of the Court.' 6 5
60 See Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 1194-98.
61 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
62 See id. at 736-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6 3 Id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
64 515 U.S. 200, 271 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
65 Id.
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But this brings me back (again) to where I began, to Justice Ginsburg's
courage and candor. For while she is sensitive to the need for collegiality, the
lesson she teaches for judges of all stripes is not that judging is a passionless
or bloodless activity. Those who know her can attest to her passion, as do the
published reports of her reading aloud her dissents two Terms ago in
Ledbetter and Carhart.66 Justice Ginsburg recognizes what is at stake in the
job of judging, particularly at the Court on which she sits.
Her concern about collegiality thus does not overshadow her sense of
obligation to dissent or to concur separately when she concludes that doing
so is warranted by her views. Rather, the very collegiality that she has sought
to encourage provides space for the candid and forthright manner in which
she writes when she disagrees with her colleagues. And this, too, is an
important lesson for judges who serve on multimember courts.
In a New York University Law Review article in 1992, she emphasized
that separate writing was not, in her words, a "consummation[] devoutly to
be avoided,"6 7 and Justice Ginsburg has written powerful and significant
dissents in a wide range of cases. These dissents are not characterized by
personal attack. They avoid needless invective, but Justice Ginsburg's prose
can be unflinching and direct. She does not shy away from clear expressions
of the significance of the case before her or of the depth of her disagreement
with the views of the Court majority.
This directness was perhaps on clearest display in her dissent in what is
perhaps the most important case on which she has ruled, Bush v. Gore, in
which the Court majority of course stopped the counting of presidential
election ballots in Florida ordered by that State's Supreme Court.68 One of
her law clerks at the time has been quoted as saying that, despite the stakes
and the division on the Court, "I was struck by how much of an institutional
citizen [Justice Ginsburg] was, how attuned to the wishes of her colleagues
and to not giving offense." 69 Yet there she wrote: "the Court's conclusion that
a constitutionally adequate recount is impractical is a prophecy the Court's
own judgment will not allow to be tested. Such an untested prophecy should
not decide the Presidency of the United States. I dissent.
70
That degree of clarity is a hallmark of her most significant writing on the
Court, in majority opinions and dissents, in cases of substantial and less
substantial national importance. The strength it demonstrates is doubtless a
reflection in large measure of Justice Ginsburg's background and experience.
66 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); see Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents
Give Ginsburg a New Voice, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at Al.
67 Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 1194.
68 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam).
69 Greenhouse, supra note 66.
70 Bush, 531 U.S. at 144 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (paragraph break omitted).
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And regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with the merits of her
decisions, Justice Ginsburg's understanding of her ultimate obligation-to
rule on the cases before her to the best of her ability, and to state her
conclusions, even when controversial, with directness and without fear-is
perhaps the most important lesson for other judges of her work on our
Supreme Court.

